The Reformation of Scholarship: A Reply to Debora Shuger by Simpson, William James
The Reformation of Scholarship:
A Reply to Debora Shuger
The Harvard community has made this
article openly available.  Please share  how
this access benefits you. Your story matters
Citation Simpson, J. 2012. The Reformation of Scholarship: A Reply to
Debora Shuger. Journal of Medieval and Early Modern Studies 42(2):
249–268.
Published Version doi:10.1215/10829636-1571876
Citable link http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:14807877
Terms of Use This article was downloaded from Harvard University’s DASH
repository, and is made available under the terms and conditions
applicable to Open Access Policy Articles, as set forth at http://
nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-
use#OAP
 1 
The Reformation of Scholarship: A Reply to Debora Shuger 
James Simpson 
Harvard University 
 
In 2008 Debora Shuger published an essay, “The 
Reformation of Penance,” in which she took aim at 
revisionist Reformation scholarship.1 By “revisionist 
Reformation scholarship,” Shuger means a relatively small 
slice of the vast scholarship on the Reformation.2 She takes 
aim at that scholarship on the Reformation in Britain, 
produced in the last twenty or so years, which dissents 
from the Whig, Protestant-triumphalist account. To put the 
matter crudely, this revisionist scholarship presents the 
English Reformation as more top-down than bottom up.3  
In fact her target is even more restricted than this 
revisionist historical scholarship. Shuger does not make 
this crucial distinction, but there is in fact a sharp 
difference between revisionist historical scholarship on 
the one hand, and, on the other, a revisionist literary 
historical movement in English literary studies, also now 
about twenty years old.4 The interests and commitments of 
the literary historians were and remain significantly 
different from, even largely opposed to, those of the 
revisionist historians. While the religious historians 
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restrict themselves to religion and write from within 
unmistakable confessional traditions, literary historians 
focus instead on the key term “periodization,” whose 
significance extended across all discursive practice, 
religious and secular.5 While the religious historians are 
committed to a later medieval period characterized by 
wholly coherent, largely consensual cultural practice, the 
literary historians perceive a later medieval period 
characterized by contest and dynamic cultural dissonance. 
The confessional historians are determined to dig the 
medieval/Early Modern periodic boundaries even deeper; the 
literary historians seek, on the contrary, to test out the 
force of an alternative periodization altogether. That 
alternative might extend coherently from, say, Lollardy to 
the Civil War. 
Ignoring these distinctions, Shuger took aim in 
particular at “revisionist” treatment of the sacrament of 
penance. She used my Reform and Cultural Revolution, 
published in 2002, as exemplary of the error of the 
revisionists with regard to penance.6 Her larger charge 
against the revisionists is that they tend to offer a 
history of Loss, and that they have introduced “polemical 
distortion” into Reformation scholarship that had been free 
of that for fifty or so years. Her specific charges against 
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my book are that I mischaracterize post-Reformation 
theology of penance in two respects: the value of works in 
penitence; and the function of satisfaction. By way of 
correction, Shuger offers her own account of Protestant 
soteriology, and makes comparison with contemporary legal 
practice. 
In my view, Shuger does the following in her essay: 
she mischaracterizes pre-Reformation theology of penance; 
and she deeply underestimates the seriousness with which 
Reformation soteriological theology undoes its principal 
pre-Reformation counterpart. Before I turn to those more 
specific arguments of intellectual history, I am bound to 
step back from the heat of controversy and remark both on 
my admiration for Debora Shuger’s scholarship in general, 
and on my lack of admiration for her scholarly procedure in 
this particular essay. My focus on the fragility of her 
scholarly procedure is, of course, in part polemical, but 
in part also designed to establish basic ground rules of 
engagement in this territory. That such an accomplished 
scholar should herself make such elementary errors of 
method in this debate is so striking as to deserve pause 
and comment.  My brief response, then, comes under two 
heads: (i) methodology; and (ii) intellectual history. My 
aim across both is less self-defense (though of course I 
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also intend to achieve that) and more reflection on 
“polemical distortion.”  
 
I 
 
My account of pre-Reformation theology is erroneous, 
according to Shuger. Let us, she suggests, take a good look 
at how “late medieval Catholic theology envisaged the 
process of meriting salvation through penitential works.” 
Her test case is William Allen’s Defense...[of] Purgatory, 
published in 1565,7 “which summarizes the late medieval 
doctrine of penance.”8 This work, we are assured, is of 
particular value, because “Allen was not some village 
priest, whose theology might be thought eccentric or sub-
Christian, but an Oxford man and future cardinal.”9 
Before we proceed any further, let us pause to 
consider whether or not William Allen is fairly described 
as typical of “late medieval Catholic theology.” Allen was 
indeed educated at Oxford; he graduated in 1550. Between 
1556 and 1558 he “he must have been actively involved in 
the Marian purge of the university”;10 with the accession of 
Elizabeth he stayed in Oxford until 1560, before finally 
leaving England never to return in May 1565. That same 
month he published the text that Shuger takes as typical of 
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late medieval “Catholic” theology, precisely because it was 
written by a future cardinal, and not some “village 
priest.” We need not pursue the rest of Allen’s career as a 
leading English recusant; as founder of the English College 
at Douai; as promoter of the Catholic missionary effort in 
England, however intense the danger faced by missionaries; 
as very willing recipient of the support of the Spanish 
monarchy; as promoter of Jesuit spirituality; as ardent 
papalist for whom the excommunication of Queen Elizabeth 
was central to his program; as active planner of invasions 
of England; and as protester  against the torture of 
Catholics.11 
We need not pursue that later career, but we do need 
to say that, on the face of it, someone less typical of 
late medieval theologians would be hard to imagine, 
precisely because Allen was a cardinal, and precisely 
because his entire polemical life was conducted in exile, 
in conditions and environments of a kind unknown to any 
pre-Reformation English priest. 
Shuger, perhaps, might at this point object (weakly) 
that Allen’s biography is beside the point; we will need 
instead to consider the theology, not the theologian, for 
the claim that Allen’s work is of “particular value” for 
its summary of the late medieval doctrine of penance.12 I 
 6 
turn, accordingly, to Shuger’s exhibit A, William Allen’s 
Defense...[of] Purgatory. This was published in 1565, just 
two years after the final session of the Council of Trent. 
It is very long (just under 600 pages), and not in fact 
about the sacrament of penance at all. The text is instead 
a defense, simultaneously cumbrous and ferocious, of the 
existence of purgatory, as its title declares.  The 
cumbrousness derives from its extensive citation of 
Biblical and patristic support texts, while the ferocity 
derives from its account of the inadequacy of the sacrament 
of penance.  
Allen confronted powerful and derisive evangelical 
dismissal of the existence of purgatory. That dismissal was 
already of at least forty years standing in England by the 
time Allen wrote in 1565.13 Faced with that tradition, Allen 
defensively insists on the both the fact and the ferocity 
of purgatorial pain as compensating for the insufficiency 
of penance. Such penitential pain as cannot be discharged 
in this life must be discharged in the afterlife; so it is 
that even the righteous must cry for forgiveness after 
death, 
crying without ceasing forgive us our debtes: Quia non 
iustificabitur in conspectu tuo omnis vivens. For no 
man alive shall be able to stand before the face of 
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God in his own justice or righteousness, and if these 
light sins should never be imputed, then it were 
needless to cry for mercy, or confess debt, as every 
man doth, be he never so passing holy.14 
This passage is clearly written by someone who has been 
reading, and wishes to answer, evangelical soteriology. The 
buzz words “righteousness” and “imputed”; the use of a 
citation from the penitential Psalm 142 (Vulgate) that 
would strike an evangelical ear and eye: these features 
imply a web of interlocution specific to the sixteenth 
century. This is, needless to say, unsurprising, given that 
Allen is writing in the 1560s, in the wake of what for him 
must have been shocking defeat; Melanchthon and Calvin are 
among his stated interlocutors in the text.15 
In sum, my lesser, though substantial, point is this: 
Allen’s text is not a summary of the late medieval doctrine 
of penance at all. The larger, historiographical point is 
that the text is in no way typical of late medieval 
theology. It is, as all texts are, one way or another, 
instead very much of its moment, fighting battles specific 
to that moment. 
Shuger’s case is that because Allen is a prominent 
sixteenth-century Catholic cardinal and theologian, he is 
therefore a typical representative of late medieval 
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theology. I leave aside the question of who is more 
representative, village priest or future cardinal (or any 
other contender). Even as it stands, however, Shuger’s 
assumption is, in my view, irretrievably flawed. The 
assumption is symptomatic of a historiography for which 
confessional identities are stable across time, and of a 
historiography for which those stable confessional 
identities are the cause, not the product of historical 
change.16 Such an assumption contravenes a basic principle 
of historicism -- that of historical specificity –- in so 
flagrant a way that the point need not, perhaps, be further 
belabored. True, Shuger notes in a footnote that the tract 
is “obviously postmedieval,” but insists that its theology 
is that of the “standard high scholastic model.”17 Even were 
it the case that Allen was repeating the “standard” line 
(which even from our tiny example we can see is not the 
case), the standard line repeated in new circumstances is 
no longer the standard line; the circumstances invest it 
with new meaning. 
So Shuger, it seems to me, commits a serious breach of 
historicist protocol. She connects and identifies two very 
different historical moments.  Her large conflation of 
periodic and confessional descriptions is not, however, the 
only such conflation in the essay under review. Shuger 
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wants to go very much further. For she goes on to conflate 
a pre-twelfth-century penitential regime with two others: a 
late medieval and a Counter-Reformation regime. She thus 
argues that, because Allen’s penitential system is focused 
on specific acts, it is identifiable with much more archaic 
systems. She has in mind the pre-inquisitional, pre-
twelfth-century penitential system, in which sins had 
specific payments, and in which penitence was primarily a 
form of social reconciliation.18 By Shuger’s account, 
Allen’s “persistent metaphors…rise from archaic ground.” 
This “secular system of composition migrated from early 
Germanic tribal codes into the Anglo-Saxon penitentials and 
from thence into the Continental ones, so that by the ninth 
century it had become standard church practice to allow a 
corporeal penance…to be commuted into a monetary payment.”19 
Shuger wants closely to associate this system with Allen’s 
post-Tridentine account of penance. 
Shuger, then, elides very large cultural territories 
here. In fact she elides at least three very distinct 
regimes ranging from the seventh to the late sixteenth 
century: early medieval, pre-inquisitional penitential 
regimes designed primarily to achieve social 
reconciliation; late twelfth-century inquisitional, private 
penitential regimes, themselves derived form new legal 
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cultures in which confession was the queen of proofs;20 and 
counter-Reformation penitential theory.21 All three of these 
systems are subsumed under the term “late medieval doctrine 
of penance.” Of course there are connections between these 
regimes, but there are also significant differences.22 
Elision of this vast and differentiated stretch of cultural 
history onto a monolithic block simply will not do. 
 
II 
 
Methodologically, then, Shuger’s characterization of 
late medieval penitential theology stands in need of entire 
restructuring. What of her descriptions of intellectual 
history? Are they any more compelling?  
Shuger’s disagreement with Reform and Cultural 
Revolution focuses on two points (i.e. the value of works 
and the place of satisfaction) on which I am said to 
“center” my discussion. 23 I readily concede that I do 
center my account on the differing function of works in 
late medieval and evangelical theology. The question of 
satisfaction is not, however, central to my argument at 
all; in fact it consists of one subordinate clause. 
Shuger’s unhappiness with the subordinate clause concerns 
the question of whether satisfaction precedes or follows 
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absolution.24 She insists that it follows absolution. I 
thank Shuger for her possibly just correction of my 
subordinate clause,25 on which I will reflect, but for the 
rest of this essay I focus on the issue of works. That 
issue is, I agree, central to my argument, and central to 
our difference.  
Shuger posits the following: (i) that “Tudor 
protestants, like medieval Catholics, repeatedly affirm 
that our good works and our repentances, both of which are 
themselves God’s gifts, do have, in Simpson’s words, ‘a 
real purchase on God’”26; and (ii) that the Protestant 
account of divine justice is not retributive. Protestant 
writers “consistently reject this [retributive] model”;27 
“with the rejection of revenge as the end of divine justice 
comes a change in its object, which is no longer the act 
but…the person.” The self, by this account, is conceived as 
“simultaneously embodied in and anterior to its actions”28 A 
“tit for tat” conception of retribution now repudiated, the 
“objects of divine judgment are not tats, but people.”29 
Shuger gives some examples of a kindly, fatherly Protestant 
God whose “old kindness” encourages the sinner. The 
sinner’s heart is not at rest until he has “heard the voice 
of his father that all is forgiven.”30 This new concept of 
selfhood is aligned with the jurisprudence of equity; the 
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absence of a “retributive theory of punishment” in “Tudor-
Stuart jurisprudence seems remarkable indeed.”31 Shuger 
aligns the jurisprudence of equity, as it looks to persons 
beyond acts, with the absence of a retributive, works-
directed soteriology in evangelical theology. 
In sum, as distinct from an archaic, retributive, tit 
for tat medieval “Catholic” system that characterizes early 
medieval, late medieval and Counter-Reformation penitential 
theology, we have a Protestant penitential system that 
recognizes people; that is not retributive; and that is 
analogous with the legal practice of Chancery, which judges 
“ad personam, in contrast to the common law, which judges 
ad rem.” All the examples given are examples of kindly 
forgiveness. 
How do I respond to this especially stark, extensive 
and rigid periodic characterization? One simple response 
would be to point out that my book took the story only up 
to 1547. For Shuger to cite the astonishingly subtle and 
profound Hooker, for example,32 is entirely beside the 
point, since Hooker’s Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity 
was published in the 1590s and beyond, when the 
institutional situation of the English Church was entirely 
different. The same is true of her citations of Spenser, 
Donne, and Coke. My book was about that fascinating, fluid, 
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pre-institutionalized, pre-confessionalized stage of post-
Reformation culture, up to the death of Henry VIII. 
Shuger’s slide away from the first half of the sixteenth 
century constitutes a further major error of method.  
Then how do I respond to Shuger’s intellectual history 
as it applies to the first half of the sixteenth century? 
Shuger confesses herself bewildered by Reformation 
revisionism. Revisionists are dismissed as merely 
“partisan.” After all, faced with such a stark contrast of 
a vengeful, retributive Catholic soteriology and its 
equitable, kindly Protestant counterpart that considers 
people not tats, how could the revisionists engage in such 
“polemical distortion”? “Truly,” comes the response at the 
close of Shuger’s essay, “I don’t understand why.” 
In my view Shuger’s incomprehension of revisionism 
derives from her massive under-reading of the seriousness 
of the Lutheran position. Never once does Shuger mention 
Luther’s relentless, repeated dismissal of works as a way 
of remitting the debt of sin; Luther’s consistent and 
fierce denial of free will; or Luther’s predestinarianism. 
Neither, in her account of the Lutheran emphasis on person 
before act, does she make mention of the Lutheran notion of 
simul iustus et peccator (simultaneously justified and a 
sinner). To be sure, Luther does focus relentlessly on the 
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legal persona before the act, but that legal persona is 
judged always already guilty, and guilty before any act. 
This is not equity as Shuger describes it. 
I could cite passages from Luther and Tyndale to 
exemplify these much darker positions. Anyone, however, who 
knows the material will be unsurprised, and perhaps a 
little bored, by such a blow by blow set of citations. They 
can all be found in the standard sources.33  
Alternatively, we could lay out the basic ingredients 
of the Christian theologies of justification, particularly 
as regards penance. If we did that, we would say that all 
such theologies are conscious of works at one end and grace 
at another. Christians can reconcile themselves with God’s 
justice either though works, or through God’s gift 
(“gratia”). Theologies at one end of the spectrum of 
possible combinations lay powerful emphasis on human free 
will and capacity to perform effective works that satisfy 
God (e.g. Pelagianism). At the other end of the spectrum, 
other theologies deny the possibility of free will, and 
assert that reconciliation is wholly a matter of God’s 
gracious gift (e.g. Lutheranism). Between these two 
extremes, other theologies develop a dialectic of works and 
grace. These middle-ground theologies recognize that 
everything is ultimately dependent on divine grace, but 
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posit that God will graciously allow works into the 
equation one way or another. Along this spectrum, we would 
place most late medieval positions somewhere in that middle 
ground, positing a dialectic of works and grace. By 
contrast, we would place the Lutheranism that entered 
England in the 1520s on the far end of the grace alone end: 
even more extreme than Augustine, Luther denies the freedom 
of the will and derides the possibility of good works. This 
is uncontentious and rehearses platitudes of theological 
history.34      
Rather than hammering these platitudes, let us, then, 
instead, attempt to capture afresh the shock of the 
Lutheran new by turning to a sixteenth-century source. If 
Shuger, happily in possession of her forgiving and 
equitable evangelical soteriology, is bewildered by 
revisionists, let us listen to a mirroring bewilderment 
from the sixteenth century.  
In Book 8 of his Confutation of Tyndale’s Answer  
(1532-33),35 Thomas More responds to the evangelical Robert 
Barnes’ account of where the Church is, and how she is to 
be known. Instead of deploying direct attack, More reverts 
to a much more efficient technique, the use of fiction. He 
imagines not a cardinal as his best representative of pre-
Reformation soteriology in the 1530s, but instead a 
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merchant’s wife: “let us suppose that some good honest 
merchant’s wife…had begun to fall in some doubt and fear, 
lest the faith that she had before learned of the 
Church…were untrue and dangerous to live and die in.” As he 
does with the young scholar in the Dialogue Concerning 
Heresies (1529), More carefully positions the woman as 
hesitating between the religion in which she grew up, and 
the new religion.36  
The woman procures a copy of Barnes’ book and reads it 
secretly, partly pleased, partly displeased.37 Moved to meet 
with Barnes, she is brought to “where none were present but 
such as were toward the fraternity” (More evokes the lexis 
of the conventicle); she promises Barnes that she will no 
longer believe everything the priest tells her, and asks 
him to declare just one thing, “which is the true Church?”38 
“Barnes” directs her to read “the new testament of 
Tyndale’s translation, and other books of his, and of his 
own…and therein should she find the truth.”39 The woman 
replies that scripture is hard; besides, teachers expound 
it in such contradictory ways, some “for the sacraments, 
and some against them…some for good works, and some for 
faith alone, some for purgatory and some against it.” So 
she needs a reliable teacher, “unto whose credence I may 
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trust in the construction.” She needs to know the preacher 
before she can know scripture. 
More is clearly framing his narrative to suit his own 
interests here, by underlining the fact that Scripture does 
not interpret itself, and requires an interpretive 
community of trust.40 Where, however, is the woman to find 
the true preacher through knowledge of whom she will know 
Scripture? Of course, Barnes will tell the woman that she 
will be moved inwardly to acknowledge the true preacher 
when she meets him, to which suggestion the woman is 
imagined to reply that “one example at one time of one 
man’s deed…giveth us not a general rule.”41 We are now so 
far removed from Christ, that the grounds for trusting in 
one man who would construe the scriptures are less secure, 
especially as he will disagree with many of his “own 
fellows.” 
Barnes will object at this point that the common 
preachers of the carnal Church make men believe that “dumb 
sacraments, and ceremonies, and good works, should do good 
to the soul,” by contrast with the “new preachers of the 
very true Church which is spiritual.” More’s imagined wife 
becomes ever more recalcitrant, since she insists that she 
can only know that a preacher’s doctrine is true not by his 
own authority, but only on account of the surety she has 
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that the preacher’s doctrine is the doctrine of the whole 
catholic Church.  
Her questions about the whereabouts of the Church are 
forceful, but less impassioned than her comments about the 
soteriological consequences of that invisible Church. Every 
saved person, Barnes is imagined saying, “shall attain the 
salvation by the only election of the Lord, without any 
part of their own devoir any thing doing thereto.”42 The 
wife imagines the case of her neighbor and herself coming 
to church in order to learn the right way to heaven. Do you 
expect me to believe, the wife is imagined saying, that God 
will bring her to heaven, and “leave me still in darkness 
and ignorance, and let me fall into hell, for none other 
cause but only for he [God] list to choose her, and leave 
me unchosen?”43 Is she expected to believe that God would 
act thus, without any reason other than his not wishing to 
choose her? “In good faith,” concludes the wife to Barnes, 
“I take God for so good that I can never believe you 
therein.”44  
According to the new theology we must, says the wife, 
believe that we shall be damned unless we believe 
correctly, and that we can believe correctly only by 
scripture. But that scripture can be learned only by a true 
teacher, whose identity is impossible to know; and God will 
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damn us for not understanding it correctly, regardless of 
our works. 
The wife, in short, focuses principally in the 
question of the true Church’s identity, whereabouts and 
authorization. Those issues also, however, inevitably 
provoke soteriological questions. Once she broaches 
evangelical soteriology, the wife points to what strikes 
her as the sheer monstrosity of a God who looks to persons 
without regard to acts, and a God whose choices remain 
utterly inscrutable. 
Now of course More nor his imagined wife are not 
exactly typical of late medieval theology either, but the 
Confutation is a valuable source at this point for 
registering the shocked incredulity that predestinarian 
soteriology provoked by comparison with a subtle 
alternative that takes works and free will into account.  
Leaving More’s fictional wife aside, is it 
unreasonable of More thus to express shock at evangelical 
theology in 1532? Rather than following Shuger by reverting 
at this point to, say, Hooker, let us turn instead to some 
texts available in 1532 to answer that question. 
I begin with Luther’s account of the relation of works 
to faith in his Freedom of a Christian, of 1520:45 
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This faith cannot exist in  connection with works – 
that is to say, if you at the same time claim to be 
justified by works, whatever their character…Therefore 
the moment you begin to have faith you learn that all 
things in you are altogether blameworthy, sinful and 
damnable, as the Apostle says… “There is none 
righteous, no not one…they are all gone out of the 
way, they are all made unprofitable” [Rom. 3:10-12, 
citing Psalm 14:1-3]. When you have learned this you 
will know that, if you believe in him, you may through 
this faith become a new man in so far as your sins are 
forgiven and you are justified by the merits of 
another, namely of Christ alone.46 
This passage compresses the essence of the Lutheran system 
into short compass: humans share an irredeemable abjection 
before God; they can do nothing to escape from that 
abjection; only a psychological conviction, or faith, in 
God’s promise of salvation will serve to relieve the 
despair of one’s abject condition; the grounds of that 
promise of salvation have been laid by the works of God 
alone, in Christ. 47 
Many consequences, momentous for the formation of 
early modernity, flow from this reaffirmation of Pauline 
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spirituality. Above all, spiritual experience is relocated 
from action in the world, and placed instead in a 
psychological act of faith alone. Action in the world, 
invested with the dignity of labor, and performed in the 
hope of congruent reward, is dismissed as always already 
flawed and utterly inadequate. If action in the world is 
useless, then so too is the sacrament of penance as 
understood by the Catholic Church useless, since that 
requires works of satisfaction for sins committed. The 
Christian faces an angry God alone but for his faith in 
Christ’s saving action. In this newly defined spirituality, 
the spiritual life is essentially an emotional life, 
informed as it is by the emotional content of both terror 
and overflowing gratitude.  
Not only are works dismissed, but Scriptural 
injunction to do those works is also transformed from 
injunction to threat. For what, in the Lutheran system, is 
the function of read scripture? If the Bible is indeed an 
edifying book, the ground for that claim would presumably 
be the models of action provided by the book. If, however, 
one’s theological premise is that righteous works are 
simply out of fallen human reach, then what purpose can be 
served by the Bible’s promotion of good works? There is a 
very long history of reading in the West that defends the 
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reading of books by accentuating the way in which books 
provide ethical models.48 When Luther places the Bible in so 
central a position, we might expect him to be signing up to 
that tradition. After all, the Bible is taken not only to 
furnish many models of ethical behavior, but it 
unquestionably prescribes ethical behavior with a certain 
frequency and force.  
If we expect Luther to enlist himself in this 
tradition, we will be badly disappointed.  For, on the 
contrary, Luther explicitly denies that the works promoted 
by the Bible serve any but the function of threatening 
readers with powerlessness, and provoking despair at that 
powerlessness. The very point of the prescription is to 
insist that the reader cannot fulfill it. For Luther, the 
power to change oneself, or the world, through the models 
provided by one’s Biblical reading, is a receding horizon: 
the model for change only reveals one’s incapacity to 
imitate that model. The model, that is, can only provoke 
despair at the reader’s impuissance to base action on the 
model.  
Luther underlines this point explicitly in The Freedom 
of a Christian, and he will make it more forcefully within 
a few years, in his fierce debate with Erasmus about 
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reading, moral effort, and predestination.49 This is what he 
says in The Freedom of a Christian:  
Should you ask how it happens that faith alone 
justifies and offers us such a treasure of great 
benefits without works in view of the fact that so 
many works, ceremonies, and laws are prescribed in the 
Scriptures, I answer: First of all, remember what has 
been said, namely, that faith alone, without works, 
justifies, frees, and saves…Here we must point out 
that the entire Scripture of God is divided into two 
parts: commandments and promises. Although the 
commandments teach things that are good, the things 
taught are not done as soon as they are taught, for 
the commandments show us what we ought to do, but do 
not give us the power to do it. They are intended to 
teach man to know himself, that through them he may 
recognize his inability to do good and may despair of 
his own ability.50 
Lutheran reading is, by this account, a permanent 
experience of recession, a Tantalus-like experience of 
reaching out to something that is inevitably beyond one’s 
grasp. The point of the reading is not to offer the model, 
but to underline that the reader is too sinful to profit 
from the model. The immediate point of reading (and only 
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reading will save) is, that is, to provoke despair at that 
self anterior to works. That despair is part of the 
emotional dialectic of salvation. 
Luther’s account of soteriology fails to confirm one 
of Shuger’s claims (if we restrict her claim to the bounds 
of 1547) that “Tudor Protestants…repeatedly affirm that our 
good works and our repentances…do have…’a real purchase on 
God.’”51 But Luther was not, I concede, a Tudor Protestant. 
Tyndale, I also concede, stresses more than Luther the 
value of good works as a sign that God’s decision has gone 
in the Christian’s favor,52 but that is no affirmation of 
having purchase on God, since God is not persuaded by those 
works. 
Luther’s soteriology, in the Freedom of a Christian 
Man at any rate, does confirm another claim by Shuger, that 
the God of evangelical theologians considers not acts but 
persons. But the confirmation comes only to underline how 
Shuger under-reads the seriousness of the Lutheran 
position. For Luther, God’s pre-judgment of humans does 
pre-exist acts, not least because those acts are already 
and always irredeemably inadequate. They spring from the 
utterly fallen persona whose corruption produces the 
inadequate acts. The Lutheran drama is much more fierce 
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than can be accommodated in sentimental talk of God’s 
kindly and equitable treatment of people, not tats. 
So far, though, we have been citing Luther. If the 
territory of dispute is English materials, let us turn to 
Tyndale. What of the English reception of Lutheran 
soteriology? Was it unreasonable of More in 1532 to express 
shock at the evangelical soteriology available to him in 
England by that date?53 
The Prologue to Tyndale’s 1525 New Testament is a 
cardinal document, standing as it does as the very first 
welcome to the printed vernacular scriptures in English. A 
short introductory section is a translation of the Preface 
to Luther’s 1522 New Testament, with the rest, apparently, 
Tyndale’s own work.54 The short section drawn from Luther 
offers, as we might expect, a warm welcome. “Evangelion,” 
we are told, is a Greek word meaning “good merry, glad and 
joyful tidings, that maketh a man’s heart glad, and maketh 
him sing, dance, and leap for joy” (9). This good news is, 
however, soon subject to less uplifting intelligence about 
the self anterior to acts. In the section for which no 
Lutheran source has been located, Tyndale expatiates on 
Luther’s valuation of human worth, and here the news is 
very bad indeed.   By Adam’s fall we are “children of wrath 
and heirs of the vengeance of God by birth.” We have  
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our fellowship with the damned devils…while we are yet 
in our mother’s wombs; and though we show not forth 
the fruits of sin [as soon as we are born], yet are we 
full of the natural poison, whereof all sinful deeds 
spring, and cannot but sin outwards (be we never so 
young) [as soon as we are able to work] if occasion be 
given.” (14)55 
Of course this (and there is a good deal more of it) is 
part of the Lutheran emotional dialectic: one must, in 
faith, recognize one’s utter abjection before God, by way 
of activating God’s grace. “By grace…we are plucked out of 
Adam, the ground of all evil, and graffed in Christ, the 
root of all goodness” (14). Tyndale makes the emotional 
pattern clear: the situation is not unlike the sentenced 
criminal who sees nothing before him but “present death,” 
at which point a charter from the king arrives to deliver 
him (16):  
Likewise, when God’s law hath brought the sinner into 
knowledge of himself, and hath confounded his 
conscience and opened unto him the wrath and vengeance 
of God; then cometh good tidings. The Evangelion 
sheweth unto him the promises of God in Christ, and 
how that Christ hath purchased pardon for him, hath 
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satisfied the law for him, and hath appeased the wrath 
of God. (17) 
Tyndale articulates, then, standard Lutheran theology of 
salvation: out of a faithful self-loathing, and accurate 
estimation of total incapacity, arises an overwhelming 
sense of gratitude to a God who takes all initiative into 
his own hands and works all by grace. The text of Scripture 
here is no mere bearer of the story, since, as with the 
letter borne to the criminal awaiting execution, it plays a 
crucial part in the story. From this welcome to scripture 
we learn not only that we will appreciate our abjection 
only by reading scripture; we also learn that the same 
scripture will bring the necessary letter of release. 
Reading is an indispensable element in this soteriology, a 
bringer of good news that will not arrive if scripture is 
not also read as bad news. 
 Tyndale is not prepared to leave the “welcome” there, 
however, and goes on to summarize and develop all that’s 
been said. Our will “is locked and knit faster unto the 
will of the devil, than could an hundred thousand chains 
bind a man unto a post” (17). This submission to the devil 
is itself a textual phenomenon, as “the law and will of the 
devil is written as well in our hearts as in our members, 
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and we run headlong after the devil with full zeal, and the 
whole swing of all the power we have” (17).  
The textual experience, with the devil’s text written 
onto our hearts, is the full blown Lutheran experience of 
what I have elsewhere called “textual hatred.”56 It is 
impossible for a natural man to consent to the law or to 
believe that the God who made the law is just. Such a law 
“only setteth man at variance with God,”  
And provoketh him to and stirreth him to rail on God, 
and to blaspheme him as a cruel tyrant. For it is not 
possible for a man, till he be born again, to think 
that God is righteous to make him of so poison a 
nature…and to give him a law that is impossible for 
him to do, or to consent to; his wit, reason and will 
being so fast glued, yea, and chained unto the will of 
the devil. (18, a passage added to the 1530 version) 
This is obviously (to my mind) a fierce soteriology, 
focused relentlessly on a self anterior to acts, wholly 
because that self is so corrupt as to produce only fallen 
acts. The kindly father, whose justice operates in the 
manner of the law of equity, is wholly unrelated to 
operations of this utterly serious, fearsome deus 
absconditus. 
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 Shuger is right to insist that I lay great store by 
the differing account of works in pre- and post-Reformation 
theologies. She is also right to say that Luther focuses on 
the self anterior to acts. Her incredulity at Reformation 
revisionism arises, however, from her under-reading of that 
always already irredeemably guilty self, and the ferocity 
of its judge. 
 
 Despite my claim to step back from the heat of 
controversy, I have instead engaged in hand to hand combat 
in this essay. A defense needs to defend, it’s true. That 
said, I end by referring to the title of the present essay, 
“The Reformation of Scholarship.” I also end by frankly 
confessing that the kind of debate conducted by Shuger and 
me looks decidedly passé, by about a decade, now that 
Trans-Reformation Studies has progressed so far and so 
fast. English literary studies have indeed moved beyond the 
five-hundred year agon of mirroring Reformation polemical 
distortion, in the astonishing productivity of the last ten 
years referred to above.57 Historians have for a long time 
regarded the Reformation as part of a sequence of reforming 
moments, and routinely consider the “long Reformation,” 
even in basic text books.58 Literary historians are 
increasingly aware of the many models of relationship 
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between pre- and post-Reformation cultures in England.59 One 
of those models, relevant to the debate between Shuger and 
me, can be described as a relation of continuity, “even if 
that continuity might be visible only after the event, when 
pre-Reformation materials begin to look prophetic of the 
convulsions to come.”60 Rather than positing stark periodic 
contrasts, that is, scholarship might look to the 
“prophetic” moments before the most obvious markers of 
change. Luther, for example, may have utterly dismissed the 
late medieval distinction between God’s absolute and 
ordained power. The very impulse to make that distinction 
in the first place, however, arises from the acute late 
medieval sense of God’s absolute power that also produced 
Lutheranism.61 In English literary studies, neither “Early 
Modern” nor “Medieval Studies” are any longer comfortably 
containable periodic designators. I therefore hope that 
scholars like Shuger (for whom my admiration is in no way 
feigned) and Simpson can stop wrestling and start engaging 
in the truly transformative work of making history whole. 
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